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BOOK REVIEWS 
Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the 
Spirit by Douglas Hedley 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, 330pp. 
KEN CASEY, Kentucky Wesleyan College 
Emerson, in his panegyric on Plato, notes that "every brisk young man 
who says in succession fine things to each reluctant generation ... is 
some reader of Plato, translating into the vernacular, wittily, his good 
things." He lists a series of eminent thinkers, Boethius, Rabelais, 
Erasmus, among others, and ends with Coleridge. Modern histories of 
Platonism tend to relegate Coleridge to a minor role, at best a minor com-
mentator; however, if Douglas Hedley is corr<c'Ct, the view of Coleridge as 
a minor commentator and patchwork thinker is historically inaccurate 
and philosophically impoverishing. The book sets an ambitious project: 
philosophically it attempts to recover an overlooked rich tradition, and 
historically it seeks to set a more adequate context for evaluating 
Coleridge. The motivation for Hedley's project stems from a belief that 
part of contemporary philosophy of religion has lodged itself in a cuI de 
sac. Hedley is out to recover the possibility of a rational philosophy of 
religion grounded in Platonic Christianity and Trinitarian speculation. 
By itself, either the historical project or the philosophical project 
would be plenty ambitious. Yet, the historical project is a first install-
ment of an even grander scheme looming on the horizon of the book, a 
work that still awaits us, what Hedley calls" an adequate history of 
modern idealism." Before this can be done, Hedley takes on the smaller 
task of rightly situating Coleridge who has been read out of context in a 
variety of unflattering ways. 
First, Coleridge has not been understood in the light of the Trinitarian 
debates of the time. Second, Coleridge's Platonism is viewed through the 
lens of Schleiermacher's Plato rather than the tradition of middle and Neo 
Platonism characterized by Ficino and Renaissance Platonism. Although 
these may seem like separate misunderstandings, Hedley makes a strong 
case for seeing the two misunderstandings as all piece of a single cloth. 
Hedley's work situates Trinitarian speculation amid Middle Platonism 
as a way of understanding how a governing and creative form could 
transcend rationality and at the same time ensure a rational basis for 
understanding it. The Socinians, like the Arians before them, claimed 
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that an unbridgeable chasm exists between the infinite and the finite, that 
is, between God and created nature. Trinitarian speculation sought to 
hold fast in unity what the Socinians had divided. Hedley notes that a 
similar dialectic works in Kierkegaard and Barth. Both maintain that 
beginning from a finite point of view there can be no rational natural the-
ology. And although in both Kierkegaard and Barth a consistent dialectic 
of finitude may lead to despair, and a consistent dialectic of the infinite 
may also claim to reveal itself in history as a Teacher, no rational justifica-
tion exists for the migration from one realm to the other; hence both 
thinkers appeal for leaps of faith and appeals to revelation. 
Hedley notes that other attempts to deal with the difficulty between 
the finite and the infinite expressed themselves in various forms of 
monism; notably in Spinoza. In Spinoza's thought the infinite and the 
finite are collapsed and God and nature dissolved into one another. 
According to Hedley, Coleridge and the tradition of Platonic idealism 
attempt to frame a third alternative to fideism and monism. The Platonic 
tradition in Patristic theology allowed that God was both transcendent 
and rapt in a joyous contemplation while at the same time immanent in 
creative activity. Because the contemplation of the divine as a unitary 
being included an alterity between the persons in the Trinity, the imma-
nent expression of God in the world need not reflect a unity transcending 
all rational differentiation. Fundamental to this account, Hedley notes, is 
a voluntaristic account of God's being which avoids the danger of mak-
ing God's will arbitrary. Coleridge maintains that God's will is prior to 
God's intellect, because will does not admit of any preceding cause, 
wbereas reason does. Coleridge says, "even in man wilUs deeper than 
rnilld~ for mind does not cease to be mind by having an antecedent; but 
will is either first ... or it is not will at all" (quoted 111 Hedley, 82). Still, 
the will is not arbitrary, for in willing the intellect, there is no possibility 
of God willing anything other than what is true or good. God is pure act, 
including the act of understanding; following the Platonic tradition, the 
good is the measure of itself and of evil. Hedley helps recovers a central 
claim of Coleridge's thought that God's will, though primordial to reason 
neyertheless wills in accord with reason. 
Following some readings of Kant someone might object that all this 
metaphysical speculation on the Trinity has no grounding in our experi-
ence and dispense with matters. Coleridge, I believe, is well positioned 
to develop an interesting reply. Hedley quotes Coleridge to the effect 
that, "the mysteries of Christian faith are reason in its highest form of 
self-affirmation" (87). The experience of a Kantian critique can take one 
to the limits of will and understanding, and in the mystery here one can 
find a fruitful Trinitarian answer to its riddles. In short, the mystery of 
the Trinity has a philosophical dimension. This is not to say that a full-
blown doctrine of the Trinity can emerge on the basis of reason, but that 
the mystery of our will can lead into mystery of the Trinity. Coleridge 
has here developed a Kantian passage of ascent, analogous to Neo-
Platonic accounts. This is a daring assertion and a rich resource for 
Trinitarian natural theology. 
H.eading Kant as a springboard for a new speculative metaphysic, 
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Hedley will probably ruffle a few feathers, for doing so runs counter to 
many modem readings of Kant. However, this may be all to the good. 
Coleridge's understanding of Kant was not bound by modem conven-
tions and, if Hedlev is correct, there is stillroom for idealism to make an 
interesting depa/ture from Kant's thought that still preserves his 
insights in a metaphysics of freedom while providing a means of avoid-
ing Kant's dualisms. 
But if Coleridge had so much to offer, why was he overlooked, and 
why at present has he continued to be overlooked? A parallel question 
also suggests itself, why was the Platonic tradition also overlooked? 
Hedley'S answer, in a few words is Schliermacher and Harnack. After 
Schliermacher and Harnack the Platonic tradition becomes not merely 
overlooked but invisible. Schliermacher recast the understanding of 
Plato as essentially an artistic rather than a metaphysical thinker by 
locating Plato's essence not in the content, but in the form of his 
thought-namely the dialogue form. Harnack in his historical quest saw 
Platonism as a metaphysical element foreign to the gospel, rather than 
an attempt to formulate a coherent understanding of God revealed in 
Christ. Doubly disinherited, Coleridge and the tradition of idealism 
were thus overlooked rather than critically examined. Given the possi-
bility of a restored rational natural philosophy of religion, Hedley's 
argument for a return to Coleridgean ideas seems fruitful possibility. 
What might motivate a return to a form to Platonism if one is not 
already so disposed? Hedley suggests that Coleridge offers an intrigu-
ing way. The Delphic maxim, know thyself, provides the beginning 
point. The Platonic notion of ascent maps the way. Drawing on 
Augustine's claim that "the true philosopher is a lover of God" 
Coleridge suggests that the reflexive nature of the quest for self-knowl-
edge will lead to a reflection on the nature of mind and language that 
has important analogies with a Trinitarian understanding of God. 
Hedley turns to a deft account of Coleridge's philosophy of language. 
Coleridge defines language as "a living power which enables men to 
improve their vision of truth" (117). In line with the Augustinian 
notions of the interior teacher, Coleridge maintains that language has a 
divine origin and that all knowledge of the truth is in some sense contaet 
with the divine. Language leads us to re-fleet and to seek a transcendent 
origin. Whereas Locke and the Lockean empiricists saw mind as a pas-
sive power, Coleridge saw mind and language as an active one. For 
Coleridge tracing the origins of ideas to a series of impressions and sim-
ple elements that form the basis for more complex ideas was a dead end. 
A Lockean natural theology requires that arguments for the existence of 
God needed to be amenable to such tracing. Natural theology under 
this rubric necessarily falls back upon miracles. Biblical language also is 
understood via the Lockean way of ideas. Although sympathetic with 
the goal establishing a rational theology of other Lockeans, Coleridge 
thought that this account of language and rationality is impoverished. 
Language and reason are spiritual for Coleridge symbolizing an inward 
experience. Coleridge claims that as a symbol language "partakes of the 
Reality which it renders intelligible" (143). The biblical record is not a 
3M Faith and Philosophy 
mere historical work to be traced back to sense datum but rather a meet-
ing point in which the human and the divine come together. The lan-
guage is mystical, experiential, and spiritual. Hedley's masterful map-
ping of Coleridge's linguistic account dovetails with the speculative 
account of the will in a fruitful fashion that I think merits close attention. 
Hedley's book is a dense work, closely argued on both historical and 
philosophical grounds and will richly repay a close reading. It will 
undoubtedly stir controversy among those who, for whatever reasons, 
conceive of metaphysics as alien to the gospel or as moribund. Hedley 
introduces a rich cast of characters, especially the Cambridge Platonists 
and, in particular, Ralph Cudworth. Moving these characters to the 
foreground is enriching both as history of philosophy as well as philoso-
phy proper. Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion is a refreshing foray into 
speculative metaphysics going full tilt. It is heartening to find a willing-
ness to sort through Platonism with a charitable eye. Hedley turns up 
old resources that are under appreciated and offers a fresh current of life 
moving within the Neo-Platonic tradition and Trinitarian speculation. 
Were a list of worthy Platonic scholars being compiled today, Hedley 
might be the next in the line of those "brisk young thinkers rendering 
fine things to a reluctant generation." Heartily recommended. 
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues by Alasdair 
Macintyre (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999). ISBN 0-8126-9397-3. Pp. ix-
166, $26.95 Hard Cover. 
NICHOLAS MERIWETHER, Shawnee State University 
Those whose familiarity with the work of Alasdair MacIntyre is limited 
to his highly influential critique of modern ethical theory, After Virtue, may 
be forgiven for finding his recent publication, Dependent Rational Animals 
(henceforth: ORA), a somewhat puzzling departure. The reason ORA 
would appear to represent such an abrupt change is his assertion in After 
Virtue that an account of Aristotelian practical reasoning must relinquish 
any reference to a natural telos, or "metaphysical biology." However, in 
subsequent works incrementally, and now most emphatically in ORA, he 
has fully embraced the view that metaphysics grounded in human biology 
is ineliminable from a complete account of the ethical life. 
In his rich and provocative work since After Virtue and prior to ORA, 
MacIntyre has sought to provide a comprehensive ethical theory and 
moral epistemology on the basis of the phenomenon of practical reasoning. 
In its Aristotelian embodiment, practical reasoning describes the process 
by which the individual pursues goods internal to social practices by 
acquiring virtues, e.g., wisdom, honesty, and justice, and orienting action 
to those goods virtuously, i.e., in an excellent manner. This process is 
inherently social because the novice serves as apprentice to those who have 
mastered the practice, though this does not preclude the possibility that the 
novice will one day through acquisition of the relevant virtues exceed or 
